Horwich is does not agree with the semantic normativism adopted by Kripke in „Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”. This semantic normativism is usually criticized from two positions. The first argues that what is generally called semantic normativism is in fact a completely different form of normativism (pragmatic, logical etc). Therefore, according to this type of criticism, there would be no semantic obligations, these being just additions to the natural phenomenon of communication. The second form of critique („missing rules strategy”) reproaches to the semantic normativism that it creates confusion at the level of the types of rules adopted. Those who support this type of criticism say that semantic normativism motivates regulatory rules by invoking their constitutive powers. Given that Horwich, in his work Deflationary Theory of Meaning, argues that although the meanings have normative consequences, this normativity is not inherent to them, but derived from more general normative principles, I conclude that he is part of the critics from the first category, i. e. one of those who criticize semantic normativism by invoking the „misidentification” of norms.