Nagel claims that at least some of the facts that our world consists of are not objective, since they imply seeing the world from a different point of view, which, he considers, is impossible. Although we may know what it is like to behave like a bat, we cannot know what it feels like to be a bat. Since our world consists also of subjective facts, any science is, in a way, incomplete. Mellor argues that Nagel’s argument from “we cannot know what it feels like to have an experience” to “there is a subjective fact, that of feeling an experience” is fallacious. This, because knowing what an experience feels like entails an ability to know how to imagine that experience, and since it involves a type of “knowing-how”, it cannot be about a fact. Therefore, our lack of knowing how different experiences feel like is not problematic for our sciences, since there are no such facts that they fail to be about.