Frege’s definition of a concept puts a significant amount of pressure on the eligibility of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to determine a concept. According to Frege, vagueness and the lack of clear boundaries cannot stand for a genuine concept. In this short essay, I explore the topic and I argue that no clear boundaries are not one and the same with no boundaries at all. Using one of Wittgenstein’s ideas, I conclude that boundaries of any concept determined by family resemblance can be drawn for a special purpose.
Arhive pe categorii: filosofie analitica
Nagel claims that at least some of the facts that our world consists of are not objective, since they imply seeing the world from a different point of view, which, he considers, is impossible. Although we may know what it is like to behave like a bat, we cannot know what it feels like to be a bat. Since our world consists also of subjective facts, any science is, in a way, incomplete. Mellor argues that Nagel’s argument from “we cannot know what it feels like to have an experience” to “there is a subjective fact, that of feeling an experience” is fallacious. This, because knowing what an experience feels like entails an ability to know how to imagine that experience, and since it involves a type of “knowing-how”, it cannot be about a fact. Therefore, our lack of knowing how different experiences feel like is not problematic for our sciences, since there are no such facts that they fail to be about.
This short essay offers a brief account of Frege’s conception of logic from two main points of view: the novelty of his view on logic and the normative status of logic in his writings. I analyze Frege’s position with regard to logic by comparing it to the views of Mill and Kant. I also argue against a normative reading of Frege’s writings on the nature of logic, a reading which is not uncommon in contemporary literature.