Frege’s definition of a concept puts a significant amount of pressure on the eligibility of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to determine a concept. According to Frege, vagueness and the lack of clear boundaries cannot stand for a genuine concept. In this short essay, I explore the topic and I argue that no clear boundaries are not one and the same with no boundaries at all. Using one of Wittgenstein’s ideas, I conclude that boundaries of any concept determined by family resemblance can be drawn for a special purpose.
Arhive pe categorii: filosofia limbajului
Trecem, în a treia zi a Conferinței Naționale Online de Filosofie Teoretică pentru Studenți, la probleme ontologice. Punctul de pornire al prezentării de astăzi este următorul:
O poziție ce prevede angajarea ontologică față de categorii, fie acestea obiecte materiale, relații, proprietăți, clase sau entități matematice, poartă numele de realism platonic. Realiștii de acest gen asumă existența obiectivă a unor entități abstracte ca roșeața (proprietatea unui obiect de a fi roșu) sau relațiile dintre obiecte (e.g. fraternitatea – relația dintre doi particulari de a fi frați). Poziția naturalistă (care este obiectul lucrării de față) se opune unei astfel de perspective asupra categoriilor prin evitarea utilizării unui limbaj metafizic ce ne constrânge să ajungem la astfel de angajamente ontologice.
Textul prezentării poate fi descărcat de aici:
Dan Bragagiu – O defensivă naturalistă a statutului ontologic al categoriilor
Pe parcursul zilei de astăzi Dan Bragagiu va răspunde la întrebări și comentarii.
Horwich is does not agree with the semantic normativism adopted by Kripke in „Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”. This semantic normativism is usually criticized from two positions. The first argues that what is generally called semantic normativism is in fact a completely different form of normativism (pragmatic, logical etc). Therefore, according to this type of criticism, there would be no semantic obligations, these being just additions to the natural phenomenon of communication. The second form of critique („missing rules strategy”) reproaches to the semantic normativism that it creates confusion at the level of the types of rules adopted. Those who support this type of criticism say that semantic normativism motivates regulatory rules by invoking their constitutive powers. Given that Horwich, in his work Deflationary Theory of Meaning, argues that although the meanings have normative consequences, this normativity is not inherent to them, but derived from more general normative principles, I conclude that he is part of the critics from the first category, i. e. one of those who criticize semantic normativism by invoking the „misidentification” of norms.
Robert Chiș-Ciure – A Possible Application of Naturalistic Theories In Philosophy of Language and Mind
The aim of this paper is to argue for the palatability of a naturalistic research program in addressing the problem of intentionality of mental states and, by extensions, of linguistic expressions. In general, naturalistic theories of meaning treat mental representations as basic, whereas linguistic representations are construed as derivative (Papineau 2008). Insofar as considerations of length do not allow it, I will only point to possibly prolific prospective perspectives that this research program offers. In this sense, the structure of the paper is as follows: (i) I will offer a brief sketch of a specific naturalistic program, i.e. teleosemantics; (ii) then I will specify even more, presenting a particular version of teleosemantics, i.e. biosemantics; (iii) after that I will shortly a new understanding of propositions that will help to further naturalize the issues discussed; (iv) finally, I will indicate to a plausible application of these theories in neuroscience.
This very brief essay is concerned with Grice and Strawson’s article “In Defense of a Dogma” which was a response to Quine’s influential paper “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism”. The two authors argue that the analytic/synthetic distinction is compatible with Quine’s revisability thesis. I will attempt to criticize their argument for the compatibility between the two doctrines and show that they are indeed incompatible as Quine argued.