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Horwich is does not agree with the semantic normativism adopted by Kripke in „Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”. This semantic normativism is usually criticized from two positions. The first argues that what is generally called semantic normativism is in fact a completely different form of normativism (pragmatic, logical etc). Therefore, according to this type of criticism, there would be no semantic obligations, these being just additions to the natural phenomenon of communication. The second form of critique („missing rules strategy”) reproaches to the semantic normativism that it creates confusion at the level of the types of rules adopted. Those who support this type of criticism say that semantic normativism motivates regulatory rules by invoking their constitutive powers. Given that Horwich, in his work Deflationary Theory of Meaning, argues that although the meanings have normative consequences, this normativity is not inherent to them, but derived from more general normative principles, I conclude that he is part of the critics from the first category, i. e. one of those who criticize semantic normativism by invoking the „misidentification” of norms.
La începutul anilor 1980, odată cu lucrările lui Nancy Cartwright, emerge o literatură ce vizează un nou aspect al metodologiei științei: idealizarea. Prin intermediul paradoxului propus de către Cartwright (1980), susținerea idealizării este asociată cu o poziție antirealistă cu privire la statutul ontologic al legilor fundamentale ale naturii (și în special ale fizicii). În acest scurt eseu, aducând o serie de critici celor propuse de către Cartwright, voi încerca să arăt că procesul de idealizare poate fi însoțit de o abordare realistă a statutului ontologic al legilor naturii. Mai mult decât atât, după cum a subliniat și Weisberg (2007), voi arăta că, deși în urma criticilor aduse lui Cartwright au emers diferite noțiuni de idealizare, aceste noțiuni diferite pot fi privite mai degrabă drept complementare decât drept concurente, păstrând, în același timp, o abordare realistă.
The aim of this paper is to argue for the palatability of a naturalistic research program in addressing the problem of intentionality of mental states and, by extensions, of linguistic expressions. In general, naturalistic theories of meaning treat mental representations as basic, whereas linguistic representations are construed as derivative (Papineau 2008). Insofar as considerations of length do not allow it, I will only point to possibly prolific prospective perspectives that this research program offers. In this sense, the structure of the paper is as follows: (i) I will offer a brief sketch of a specific naturalistic program, i.e. teleosemantics; (ii) then I will specify even more, presenting a particular version of teleosemantics, i.e. biosemantics; (iii) after that I will shortly a new understanding of propositions that will help to further naturalize the issues discussed; (iv) finally, I will indicate to a plausible application of these theories in neuroscience.
Nagel claims that at least some of the facts that our world consists of are not objective, since they imply seeing the world from a different point of view, which, he considers, is impossible. Although we may know what it is like to behave like a bat, we cannot know what it feels like to be a bat. Since our world consists also of subjective facts, any science is, in a way, incomplete. Mellor argues that Nagel’s argument from “we cannot know what it feels like to have an experience” to “there is a subjective fact, that of feeling an experience” is fallacious. This, because knowing what an experience feels like entails an ability to know how to imagine that experience, and since it involves a type of “knowing-how”, it cannot be about a fact. Therefore, our lack of knowing how different experiences feel like is not problematic for our sciences, since there are no such facts that they fail to be about.
This short essay offers a brief account of Frege’s conception of logic from two main points of view: the novelty of his view on logic and the normative status of logic in his writings. I analyze Frege’s position with regard to logic by comparing it to the views of Mill and Kant. I also argue against a normative reading of Frege’s writings on the nature of logic, a reading which is not uncommon in contemporary literature.
This very brief essay is concerned with Grice and Strawson’s article “In Defense of a Dogma” which was a response to Quine’s influential paper “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism”. The two authors argue that the analytic/synthetic distinction is compatible with Quine’s revisability thesis. I will attempt to criticize their argument for the compatibility between the two doctrines and show that they are indeed incompatible as Quine argued.